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1 Introduction
The analysis of the effects of intellectual property and product market competition regu-
lations on innovation is deeply rooted in industrial organization literature (e.g., Nordhaus,
1969, Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990, Chang, 1995, Matutes, Regibeau, and Rockett, 1996,
Vives, 2008). Studies in industrial organization consider the effects of such regulations
in partial equilibrium frameworks. A large number of recent studies examine the effects
of intellectual property and product market competition regulations on innovation and
growth in general equilibrium frameworks featuring one R&D performing sector (e.g.,
Judd, 1985, Smulders and van de Klundert, 1995, Yang and Maskus, 2001, O’Donoghue
and Zweimu¨ller, 2004, Chu and Pan, 2013).
These studies have delivered answers to a number of important questions such as
“what are the optimal intellectual property regulation and product market structure?”.
Yet, the frameworks used in these studies are not well suited for the analysis of the
effects of sector specific intellectual property and product market competition regulations.
These frameworks are also not well suited for showing how such regulations in a sector
can affect innovation and growth in another sector. Considering sectoral heterogeneity
can be important because, for example, the regulation of intellectual property has been
historically different across goods and services sectors. Patents on software and business
methods are relatively recent phenomena and have proved to be very relevant to, in
particular, services sector (Tamura, Sheehan, Martinez, and Kergroach, 2005).1 The
cross-sector effects can also shed further light on the likely effects of country-level changes
in intellectual property and product market competition regulations.
In this paper, I derive a stylized endogenous growth model with two R&D performing
sectors and analyze the impact of intellectual property and product market competition
regulations on innovation and growth in the long-run. Each firm in the model has its
product line and can engage in in-house R&D, which then drives long-run growth. In a
1The division of an economy into services and goods sectors has not been very popular in studies of
innovation and growth because services have been usually thought to have very low levels of R&D and
patenting. According to Tamura et al. (2005), this perception is far from accurate at least in the OECD
countries where R&D and patenting have increased sharply in the services sector starting from the 90s.
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firm, innovation enhances firm-specific knowledge on the process of production (alterna-
tively, it enhances the knowledge for the quality of the firms’ product). This knowledge
is patented. The firms compete strategically in the output market and finance their
R&D expenditures from operating profits. In-house R&D process builds on the knowl-
edge that the firms possess. In a firm, the R&D process can be improved combining
firm’s own knowledge with the knowledge of other firms from its sector. Intellectual
property rights determine the bargaining power of licensors and licensees in the market
for knowledge/patents. More precisely, they determine the amount of knowledge that
firms can obtain without (appropriate) compensation and the amount of knowledge that
firms can license for R&D. Product market regulations determine competitive pressures
and strategic interactions among firms. I assume that intellectual property and product
market regulations can be sector specific, as well as economy wide.
In such a setup, I show that policies, which strengthen intellectual property rights
and increase product market competition in a sector, increase its R&D investments and
growth. These results mirror the results from a similar one sector model (see, Jerbashian,
2016). R&D investments increase because stronger intellectual property rights increase
the extent of appropriated returns on R&D and higher competition increases sales and, as
a consequence, it increases the marginal product of innovation. However, these policies
adversely affect R&D investments in the other sector. R&D investments in the other
sector decline because of an increased factor competition between the sectors.
A notable implication of this result is that uniform and economy wide changes in
intellectual property rights and competition have ambiguous effects on long-run growth.
Similarly, the impact of strengthening intellectual property rights and increasing product
market competition in a sector on economic growth is ambiguous.
In this model, long-run growth necessarily increases with stronger intellectual prop-
erty rights and competition in a sector if two conditions are met. The sector has the
highest weight in final output and the positive effect of these regulations on its R&D
investments and growth outweigh the negative effect of these regulations on R&D invest-
ments and growth of the other sector. For example, a split of the economy into goods and
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services sectors, which is common in aggregate-level studies, would not help to resolve the
ambiguity because these positive and negative effects are not straightforward to identify.
I make a step toward better informed long-run policy implications from the model and
perform a simple calibration exercise for goods and services sectors in Germany, the UK,
and the US. The results from this exercise suggest that economic growth in these coun-
tries increases with stronger property rights in goods and services sectors. Such results
hold when property rights are strengthened in one of these sectors and in both sectors.
They hold because stronger property rights in a sector have a large positive effect on
its growth and relatively small negative effect on the other sector. However, economic
growth almost does not change with a higher level of competition in these sectors be-
cause the positive effects of higher competition in a sector are almost fully offset by the
negative effects in the other sector. This result holds when competition is intensified in
one of these sectors and in both sectors.
This paper is closely related to Goh and Olivier (2002) and Chu (2011). Goh and
Olivier (2002) analyze the effects of changing the strength of intellectual property rights
in a growth model with two vertically related sectors and Romer (1990) style R&D and
firm entry. Chu (2011) analyzes such effects in a growth model with two (horizontally
related) sectors and Aghion and Howitt (1992) style R&D and firm entry/exit. The pol-
icy instrument governing intellectual property rights in both papers is patent breadth,
which is defined by the power of patentees in the product market. The analysis of this
paper is complementary to the analyses and results of Goh and Olivier (2002) and Chu
(2011) in a number of ways. In contrast to these papers, R&D in a firm improves the
production process (or the quality) of a good and is performed in-house by the firm in
the current paper. This modeling choice is motivated by an observation that large, in-
cumbent firms are responsible for sizeable portions of R&D, patenting and cross-licensing
activities. Moreover, in the model of this paper, the regulation of intellectual property is
distinct from product market regulation. The regulation of intellectual property affects
the bargaining power of firms in the market for patents/knowledge.2 This paper also
2The interaction of Apple Inc, Google, and Microsoft in product and patent markets provides a seemingly
appropriate example motivating such a separation. These firms are rivals in product markets and have
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performs a simple quantitative analysis for goods and services sectors.
Having a focus on long-run growth, the analysis of this paper omits potential welfare
effects of regulations of intellectual property and product market competition. Judd
(1985), Futagami and Iwaisako (2007), Chu (2009) and Jerbashian (2016), among others,
analyze the welfare effects of intellectual property regulations. In turn, Forni, Gerali, and
Pisani (2010), Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo (2014) and Papageorgiou and Vourvachaki
(2015) offer a detailed account of welfare implications of product market regulations in
large, comprehensive frameworks. The frameworks of these latter studies, however, do
not feature sector specific endogenous changes in technology. My quantitative results
suggest that this is not a significant omission at least from the perspective of long-run
growth because product market regulations are not likely to affect it.3
The results of this paper also have implications for empirical analysis of the effects
of intellectual property regulations and the intensity of competition on innovation and
growth in a sector (e.g., Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen, 1999, Aghion, Bloom, Blun-
dell, Griffith, and Howitt, 2005). The results highlight a necessity of taking into account
intellectual property regulation and the intensity of competition in the remainder of the
economy (or closely related sectors) in such studies.
The next section introduces the model. Section 3 offers the results from the model
and a simple calibration exercise. Section 4 concludes. The proofs of the results are
offered at the end of the paper.
2 The Model
Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical and infinitely lived households of
mass one. The representative household is endowed with a fixed amount of labor L, which
it supplies inelastically. The household has a logarithmic utility function and discounts
varying degrees of bargaining power in licensing agreements.
3The agenda of the European Commission includes increasing competition in member states and, in
particular, in the services sector. My quantitative results suggest that the effects of such policies on
long-run growth can be quite limited.
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the future streams of utility with rate ρ. The utility gains are from the consumption of
amount C of consumption goods. The lifetime utility of the household is given by
U =
+∞∫
0
lnCt exp (−ρt) dt.
The household maximizes its lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint,
A˙ = rA+ wL− C, (1)
where A are the household’s asset holdings [A (0) > 0], r and w are the market returns
on its asset holdings and labor supply.
The household’s optimal problem implies that consumption adheres the standard
Euler equation,
C˙
C
= r − ρ. (2)
This equation, together with the budget constraint (1), describes the paths of the house-
hold’s consumption and assets.
Consumption goods are a Cobb-Douglas basket of X1 and X2 intermediate goods,
where X1 is a CES aggregate of all products produced in sector 1, x1, and X2 is a CES
aggregate of all products produced in sector 2, x2. Sector k = 1, 2 produces Nk number
of differentiated products. The elasticity of substitution between products in sector k is
εk > 1. Formally, consumption goods are given by
C = Xσ11 X
σ2
2 , (3)
where
Xk =
(
Nk∑
j=1
x
εk−1
εk
k,j
) εk
εk−1
, (4)
and σ1 + σ2 = 1, σk > 0, εk > 1, and k = 1, 2.
The household optimally combines {x1,j}N1j=1 and {x2,j}N2j=1 in C. In order to do so, it
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solves the following problem:
max
{xk,j}Nk
j=1
{
C −
N1∑
j=1
px1,jx1,j −
N2∑
j=1
px2,jx2,j
}
s.t.
(3) , (4) ,
where pxk,j is the price of xk,j and k = 1, 2. The solution of this problem implies that
pxk,jxk,j = σkC
x
εk−1
εk
k,j
Nk∑
j=1
x
εk−1
εk
k,j
. (5)
This expression characterizes the household’s demand for {xk,j}Nkj=1.
Intermediate Goods Sectors
In both sectors, firms produce distinct products and have Ricardian production technolo-
gies. For ease of exposition, it is convenient to describe the model for a firm j from sector
k. The production function of the firm j is given by
xk,j = λ
γk
k,jLxk,j , (6)
where Lxk,j is its labor input, λk,j measures its productivity (or the quality of its product),
and γk ∈ (0, 1]. The level of the productivity λk,j indicates the knowledge of the firm j
about its production process. This knowledge is patented.
In both sectors, firms can engage in-house R&D, which allows them to improve their
productivity. They hire labor Lr in order to perform R&D. In a firm, the researchers use
the knowledge of the firm and combine it with the knowledge of other firms in its sector
to generate a new one. Within a sector, the firms can licence knowledge/patents from
each other. There are also knowledge spillovers among the firms and the firms obtain
some knowledge without compensation/for free. The knowledge production technology
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of the firm j from sector k is given by
λ˙k,j = ξk
[
Nk∑
i=1
λ¯
αk,1
k,i (uk,j,iλk,i)
αk,2
]
λ1−α˜kk,j Lrk,j , (7)
αk,1, αk,2 > 0; α˜k = αk,1 + αk,2; α˜k < 1,
where ξk is an exogenous productivity level, uk,j,i is the share of knowledge that the
firm j licenses/purchases from a firm i, λk,i, and uk,j,j ≡ 1. The term λ¯k represents the
spillovers of knowledge among firms in sector k. In turn, I assume that αk,1 > 0, αk,2 > 0
and αk,1 + αk,2 < 1 to have that spillovers, licensing, and the knowledge of the firm are
productive in R&D.
The firm j maximizes the present discounted value of its profit streams. Revenues
of the firm j are gathered from the supply of its good and license fees on its knowl-
edge/patents. Its costs are labor compensations and license fees it pays for using the
knowledge/patents of other firms. Under Cournot competition, the firm chooses quan-
tities taking the demand for its good as given, whereas under Bertrand competition it
chooses prices. The optimal problem of the firm j is given by
Vk,j (t) = max
Cournot: Lxk,j ,Lrk,j ,{uk,j,i,uk,i,j}Nki=1;(i6=j)
Bertrand: pxk,j ,Lrk,j ,{uk,j,i,uk,i,j}Nki=1;(i 6=j)

+∞∫
t
pik,j
(
t˜
)
exp
[
−
t˜∫
t
r (s) ds
]
dt˜

s.t.
(5) , (6) , (7) ,
where t is the entry date,
pik,j = pxk,jxk,j − w
(
Lxk,j + Lrk,j
)
(8)
+
[
Nk∑
i=1,i 6=j
pλk,j (uk,i,jλk,j)−
Nk∑
i=1,i 6=j
pλk,i (uk,j,iλk,i)
]
,
and pλk,j and pλk,i are the license fees for uk,j,i and uk,i,j shares of λk,j and λk,i patent
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portfolios.4
From the optimal problem, it follows that the demands for labor for production and
R&D of the firm j are given by
w =
(
1− 1
ek,j
)
pxk,j
xk,j
Lxk,j
, (9)
w = qλk,j
λ˙k,j
Lrk,j
, (10)
where ek,j is the elasticity of substitution perceived by the firm j and qλk,j is the shadow
value of knowledge accumulation.
The perceived elasticity of substitution depends on the type of competition. It can
be shown that under Bertrand competition it is given by
ek,j = εk −
(εk − 1) p
1−εk
xk,j
Nk∑
j=1
p1−εkxk,j
 , (11)
and under Cournot competition it is given by
ek,j = εk
1 +
(εk − 1) x
εk−1
εk
i,j
Nk∑
j=1
x
εk−1
εk
k,j


−1
. (12)
From the optimal problem it also follows that the supply of knowledge, the demand
for knowledge, and the returns on knowledge accumulation are given by
uk,i,j = 1, (13)
pλk,i = qλk,jαk,2ξk
[
λ¯k (uk,j,iλk,i)
αk,2
]
λ
1−αk,1−αk,2
k,j
uk,j,iλk,i
Lrk,j , (14)
4The results of this paper depend on the assumption that the same type of labor is employed in production
and R&D in both industries. This is not an uncommon assumption and is maintained, for example, by
Klenow (1996) and Goh and Olivier (2002).
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and
q˙λk,j
qλk,j
= r −
(
γk
ek,j − 1
ek,j
pxk,j
qλk,j
xk,j
λk,j
+
Nk∑
i=1,i 6=j
pλk,j
qλk,j
uk,i,j +
∂λ˙k,j
∂λk,j
)
, (15)
where
∂λ˙k,j
∂λk,j
= ξkλ¯kLrk,j (16)
×
{
αk,2λ
−αk,1
k,j + (1− αk,1 − αk,2)
[
Nk∑
i=1
(uk,j,iλk,i)
αk,2
]
λ
−αk,1−αk,2
k,j
}
.
Firms license the entire portfolio of their patents/knowledge according to (13). They
do so because there are no costs associated with licensing and there are no strategic
considerations in the market for knowledge.5 In turn, firms are willing to pay a positive
fee for licensing knowledge according to (14) because that helps them to improve their
R&D process. They are also able to obtain some knowledge for free, which is represented
by λ¯k. I assume that, in equilibrium, these spillovers among firms are proportional to the
average level of knowledge in the economy and are given by
λ¯k =
1
Nk
Nk∑
j=1
λk,j, (17)
so that in a symmetric equilibrium they are the same as the knowledge of any particular
firm.
Stronger intellectual property rights reduce the ability of firms to obtain knowledge
without appropriate compensation. In this setup, strengthening intellectual property
rights corresponds to weakening spillovers, reducing αk,1 and increasing αk,2. Reducing
αk,1 and increasing αk,2 increases the compensation of licensors and firms’ returns on
knowledge accumulation and reduces free-riding according to (14) and (15). In this
sense, αk,1 represents the inverse of the strength of intellectual property rights in this
framework.
5These assumptions might be strong. They correspond to assuming an undistorted market for knowledge
and will not hold if, for example, there are policies/taxes which create licensing costs. I maintain these
assumptions because they help me to focus on the effects of spillovers.
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The markup over marginal costs 1/ek,j measures the market power that the firm j has
and the perceived elasticity of substitution ek,j measures the competition it faces. Clearly,
the level of competition increases with the actual elasticity of substitution εk and the
number of firms Nk. It is also higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot
competition. I assume that product market regulation is able to affect the perceived
elasticity of substitution ek,j by changing either εk or Nk or the type of competition.
Several modeling choices deserve a detailed discussion. The R&D process in (7) does
not allow exchange of knowledge between sectors. I maintain this assumption for two
reasons. Abstracting from the exchange of knowledge between sectors allows me to focus
on the effect of regulations on innovation and growth through competition for factor
inputs. Moreover, usually patent licensing is quite rare across broad sectors as compared
to patent licensing within sectors (see, for a similar assumption, Goh and Olivier, 2002,
Chu, 2011). The specification of knowledge spillovers process (17), together with the
R&D process, has the attractive property of allowing the model to have a well defined
balanced growth path.6 Moreover, the market for patents/knowledge can be thought to
be organized in terms of a Nash-bargaining game between licensees and licensors because
of this specification of knowledge spillovers. In this respect, the parameter αk,1 can be
thought to represent the bargaining power of licensees because increasing it reduces αk,2
and the compensation of licensors according to (14). The property rights system then
affects the bargaining power of the participants in the market for knowledge. For example,
it affects the process and settlements in patent litigations (see, for further discussion of
this R&D process, Jerbashian, 2016).
3 Features of the Equilibrium
I focus on a symmetric equilibrium within intermediate goods sectors. The results pertain
to long-run growth and are carried for balanced growth path.
6Similar to the models of Goh and Olivier (2002) and Chu (2011), there are scale effects in this model.
These effects are contentious (Jones, 1995, Jones and Romer, 2010), and Jerbashian (2016) shows how
to eliminate them in a one sector model, while keeping the inference for knowledge licensing intact. I
prefer the current specification because of its analytical versatility.
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In a symmetric equilibrium, from (5) and (9) it follows that
N2Lx2 = DN1Lx1 , (18)
where NkLxk is the total labor force employed in production of goods in sector k and
D =
1− σ1
σ1
e1
e1 − 1
e2 − 1
e2
. (19)
The relation between N2Lx2 and N1Lx1 in (18) is a generalization of the well known
constant shares relation between factor demands in Cobb-Douglas production functions.
It coincides with the latter when markups in sectors are zero. According to (18), N2Lx2
increases (declines) with a higher level of competition in sector 2 (sector 1). This is
because, a higher level of competition in sector 2 (sector 1) reduces prices and increases
the demand for the goods produced in sector 2 (sector 1).
Combining (18) and labor market clearing condition,
L =
2∑
k=1
(NkLxk +NkLrk) , (20)
gives a relation between production inputs in sector 1 and R&D inputs in sectors 1 and
2:
N1Lx1 = (1 +D)
−1
(
L−
2∑
k=1
NkLrk
)
. (21)
The returns on knowledge accumulation in sector k can be derived from (7), (9), (10),
(14), (13), (15), (16) and (17). They are given by
q˙λk
qλk
= r − λ˙k
λk
(
NkLxk
NkLrk
+ 1− αk,1
)
.
Combining this relation with (2), (4), (6), (9), and (10) gives
0 = ρ− λ˙k
λk
(
NkLxk
NkLrk
− αk,1
)
. (22)
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Labor allocations in sectors can be derived combining (7), (18), (21), and (22).
Proposition 1. The allocations of labor to production and R&D are given by
N1Lx1 =
ξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
α2,1
γ2
L+
(
ξ2
α2,1
γ2
1
γ1
+ ξ1
α1,1
γ1
1
γ2
)
ρ
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
} , (23)
N2Lx2 = DN1Lx1 , (24)
and
N1Lr1 =
ξ1ξ2
α2,1
γ2
L− ξ2
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
ρ
γ1
+ ξ1
ρ
γ2
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
} , (25)
N2Lr2 =
Dξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
L− ξ1
[
α1,1
γ1
(1 +D) + 1
]
ρ
γ2
+ ξ2D
ρ
γ1
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
} . (26)
The growth rates in sectors are proportional to the resources invested in R&D and
can be derived from (6), (7), (25) and (26). In turn, the growth rate of consumption
goods (final output) is given by
gC = σ1γ1gλ1 + (1− σ1) γ2gλ2 , (27)
where I use letter g to denote growth rates. This is a straightforward relation and states
that the growth rate of the economy is a weighted average of sectoral growth rates.
The exponent of the firms’ own knowledge in the R&D process, 1 − α˜k, does not
explicitly appear in equilibrium conditions (23)-(26) because R&D process is homogenous
of degree 1 in knowledge. This is also the reason why αk,2 does not appear in these
equilibrium conditions since the value of αk,2 is uniquely determined for the given values
of α˜k and αk,1. Nevertheless, the value of α˜k imposes restrictions on the sets of possible
values of αk,1 and αk,2 from above given that α˜k = αk,1 + αk,2 and αk,1, αk,2 > 0.
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Corollary 1.
• The growth rate of sector k increases with the level of competition and the strength
of property rights in sector k: ∂gλk/∂ek > 0 and ∂gλk/∂αk,1 < 0.
• The growth rate of sector k declines with the level of competition and the strength
of property rights in sector k−: ∂gλk/∂ek− < 0 and ∂gλk/∂αk−,1 > 0.
• Resources devoted to output in sectors 1 and 2 decline with the strength of property
rights in sectors 1 and 2: ∂Lxk/∂αk,1 > 0 and ∂Lxk/∂αk−,1 > 0.
The first part of the results in this corollary mimics the results from a similar one
sector model. The rate of growth in sector k increases with the level of competition in
sector k because higher competition implies higher output and sales (i.e., ∂Lxk/∂ek > 0),
which increases the marginal product of innovation.7 In turn, the rate of growth in sector
k increases with the strength of property rights in sector k because stronger property
rights increase the bargaining power of licensors, who carry the innovation, and imply
higher returns on innovation.
The second part of the results in this corollary holds because of competition for
factor inputs between sectors. A higher level of competition in a sector reduces its
prices relative to the prices of the rival sector and increases its output. This reduces
the output of the rival sector according to (18), its revenues and the marginal product
of innovation. Therefore, it reduces innovation and growth in the rival sector. In turn,
stronger property rights in a sector increase its demand for R&D investments. It then
competes more fiercely for R&D inputs in the labor market, which increases wage rates
and reduces R&D investments and growth in the rival sector. The higher wage rates are
also the reason for the third part of the results in this corollary, they drain resources for
production from both sectors.
7It can be shown that increasing competition reduces profits in (8) and there is a level of competition
when profits are equal to zero. Innovation increases with competition till this level and ceases when
the level of competition increases from this level. This is consistent with Schumpeter’s argument that
firms need to be sufficiently large to innovate and generates an inverted U-shape like relation between
competition and innovation as in the paper by Aghion et al. (2005).
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These results have implications for regulations targeting long-run growth in the econ-
omy. They imply that the effect of an economy wide, uniform increase in the level of
competition and in the strength of property rights on sectoral growth rates and the growth
rate of the economy in (27) is ambiguous. It depends on model parameters. They also
imply that the growth rate of the economy necessarily increases with the level of compe-
tition and the strength of property rights in a sector under two intuitive conditions. The
sector has the highest weight in final output, and the positive effect of these regulations
on its growth is stronger than the negative effect of these regulations on the growth of
the other sector.8 (The Technical Appendix offers formal proves for these statements).
These results suggest that it is ultimately an empirical question whether uniform
changes in intellectual property and competition regulations can increase long-run growth.
Similarly, it is an empirical question which of the sectors such regulations could target. I
make an attempt to provide an answer to these questions and to calibrate the values of
model parameters in the next section.
Quantitative Exercise
The model features expenditures on and income from patent licensing. Currently, there
are no comprehensive data for these and R&D expenditures might be contaminated by
expenditures on licensing. I take a sufficiently broad view of model variables to be able
to match them with the available data. In this sense, the calibration exercise presented
in this section is a first step toward parameterizing the model for a more informed policy
discussion.
I obtain data for the calibration exercise from the EU KLEMS database. The data
are at yearly frequency and are for Germany, the UK, and the US. Table 1 offers sample
period for each country.
I split these economies into goods and services sectors according to 1-digit ISIC (Rev.
3) code and compute the value added share of goods sector out of total value added.
8van de Klundert and Smulders (1999) offer a model with two imperfectly competitive sectors, where one
of the sectors engages in R&D. In such a framework, a higher level of competition in the sector that
performs (does not perform) R&D increases (reduces) the growth rate of the economy.
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This share has declined over time everywhere. I set σ1 to be equal to this share in sample
countries in 2007, which is the last year in sample period. I also set L = 1 and ρ = 0.02.
To calibrate the value of D, I compute price-cost margins in each sector, which are
the empirical analogues of markups 1/ek. Price-cost margin is defined as the ratio of
the difference between output and labor and intermediate costs and output.9 I take the
average of price-cost margins over sample years in each sector and country, assign these
values to 1/ek, and compute D using these values and the value of σ1.
I use (22) to calibrate the values of αk,1. This equation can be rewritten in the
following way:
αk,1 =
[(
1− 1
ek
)
Nkpxkxk
NkwLrk
− ρ
gk
]
γk, (28)
where the first term in the brackets is the ratio of value added and R&D investments in
sector k, adjusted to market power, and gk is labor productivity growth in sector k. I
adopt a broad view of R&D investments and use general investments instead. I compute
the ratios of value added and investments in goods and services sectors in sample countries
and take the averages of these ratios over sample years. These averages, together with
the calibrated values of markups, are used for the first term in the brackets. For gk, I use
the average values of labor productivity growth in goods and services sectors in sample
countries.
The values of ξ1 and ξ2 can be obtained from equations (25) and (26) for given values
of αk,1 and γk. Similarly to the equation for αk,1 (28), I rewrite these equations to have
labor productivity growth rates:
g1 = γ1
ξ1ξ2
α2,1
γ2
L− ξ2
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
ρ
γ1
+ ξ1
ρ
γ2
ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
} ,
g2 = γ2
Dξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
L− ξ1
[
α1,1
γ1
(1 +D) + 1
]
ρ
γ2
+ ξ2D
ρ
γ1
ξ1
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
} .
According to (6) and (7), ξk and γk jointly identify the effect of a marginal increase
9Griffith, Harrison, and Simpson (2010) and Jerbashian and Kochanova (2017) compute markups in a
very similar way.
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of investments on labor productivity growth. In fact, the effects of ξk and γk are not
distinguishable in that context. In what follows, I assume that γ1 = γ2 ≡ γ, which
implies that labor productivity growth differences across sectors, for a given level of
investment, are because of differences in research productivity ξk.
There are four data moments and equations, and I need to identify five parameters,
γ, αk,1, and ξk for k = 1, 2. According to (28), αk,1 increases with γ. I allow γ to freely
vary in an interval where αk,1 (γ) ∈ (0, 1) and obtain the values of αk,1 and ξk.
Admittedly, this calibration strategy is not without trade-offs and limitations. First,
the use of general investments can obscure the interpretation of αk,1. Nevertheless, I prefer
using general investments since they can be directly linked to broad measures of growth
such as the growth rate of labor productivity. They also tend to be readily available and
easily measured, at least from the perspective of this paper. Second, I use equilibrium
conditions to pin down the values of model parameters, which might be problematic
because this small model might not be a very accurate description of the real economy.
Fortunately, at least (28) does not use the entire general equilibrium structure of the
model. The model then serves the useful purpose of providing a structural interpretation
for αk,1. Third, in this calibration, I assume that the growth rate of labor productivity
is entirely driven by R&D (investments). Comin (2004) argues that the contribution of
R&D to growth is not very large. In this respect, the quantitative results of this paper
correspond to the effects of intellectual property and product market regulations on the
contribution of R&D to growth.
Table 1 summarizes the values of model parameters for the sample countries and
goods and services sectors. It also offers labor productivity growth rates in goods and
services sectors, gk, and the values of gC , which is a weighted average of labor productivity
growth rates in these sectors and is given by (27). To maintain the notation, goods sector
is sector 1 and services sector is sector 2.
A seemingly reassuring result about the values of these parameters is that spillovers
in goods sector are lower in the US than in Germany and the UK. This could be because
the protection of intellectual property in goods sector is stronger in the US than in
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Table 1: Sample Period and the Values of Model Parameters and Sectoral Growth Rates
L 1.000
rho 0.020
Sample Period σ1 1/e1 1/e2 D g1 g2 gC
Germany 1991–2007 0.311 0.090 0.230 1.873 0.029 0.018 0.021
UK 1970–2007 0.242 0.120 0.140 3.063 0.034 0.015 0.020
US 1977–2007 0.233 0.137 0.223 2.970 0.025 0.012 0.015
γ 0.020 0.040 0.070 0.100 0.130 0.160 0.180
Germany α1,1 0.111 0.221 0.387 0.553 0.719 0.885 0.996
α2,1 0.036 0.072 0.127 0.181 0.236 0.290 0.326
ξ1 33.008 16.504 9.431 6.602 5.078 4.126 3.668
ξ2 5.091 2.545 1.455 1.018 0.783 0.636 0.566
UK α1,1 0.113 0.227 0.397 0.567 0.737 0.907 > 1
α2,1 0.050 0.099 0.174 0.248 0.322 0.397 -
ξ1 53.169 26.584 15.191 10.634 8.180 6.646 -
ξ2 4.707 2.354 1.345 0.941 0.724 0.588 -
US α1,1 0.089 0.179 0.313 0.447 0.582 0.716 0.805
α2,1 0.042 0.084 0.147 0.209 0.272 0.335 0.377
ξ1 32.183 16.091 9.195 6.437 4.951 4.023 3.576
ξ2 3.664 1.832 1.047 0.733 0.564 0.458 0.407
Note: This table offers the sample period for each country and the calibrated values of model parameters. It also offers the
values of labor productivity growth rates in the sectors, gk, and the value of gC , which is given by gC = σ1g1 + (1− σ1) g2.
The values of parameters are not reported for the UK when γ = 0.180 because the value of α1,1 for the UK is greater than
1. Goods sector is sector 1 and services sector is sector 2. Goods sector is comprised of A, B, C, D, E, and F 1-digit ISIC
industries, and services sector is comprised of the remainder of 1-digit ISIC industries.
European countries. As compared to goods sector, spillovers in services in the US are
more comparable to spillovers in services in Germany and the UK and, in all countries,
they are lower than the spillovers in goods sector. The evident similarity among Germany,
the UK and the US could be because of similar levels of patent protection of business
methods and software innovations, which is relatively common in services sector and is
a recent phenomenon. However, the difference between the levels of spillovers in goods
and services sectors might not be so straightforward to attribute solely to the differences
in the protection of intellectual property. For example, differences in the levels of tacit
knowledge in goods and services sectors can also contribute to the differences between
the levels of spillovers. In the model, such differences emerge when the exponent of the
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firms’ own knowledge in the R&D process, 1 − α˜k, in the goods sector is lower than in
the services sector. This imposes a stricter restriction on the values of αk,1 from above in
the goods goods sector than in the services sector.
The values of the markups also seem to fall in a reasonable ballpark. They are very
close to the values used by, for example, Forni et al. (2010) and imply that services are
less competitive than the goods sector.
A crude way to gain more confidence about this calibration exercise and these numbers
is as follows. I compute the ratio of real investments in a sector and the sum of real value
added in services and goods sectors. I take the average of this ratio over time and assume
that it roughly corresponds to the amount of investments adjusted to the scale of the
economy (i.e., NkLrk when L = 1). Next, I compute the ratio of labor productivity
growth and the value of this ratio. According to (7), this is given by
gk/NkLrk = γξk. (29)
Finally, I compare the values obtained from this exercise with the multiplication of cali-
brated values of γ and ξk. Table 2 offers the results. The differences between the values
of γξk obtained through this exercise and through calibration turn out to be surprisingly
small.
Table 2: Calibrated Values of γξ1 and γξ2 and their Values Implied by (29)
γξ1 γξ2
Calibrated Implied by (29) Calibrated Implied by (29)
Germany 0.660 0.585 0.102 0.091
UK 1.063 0.634 0.094 0.100
US 0.644 0.530 0.073 0.075
Note: This table offers the values of γξ1 and γξ2 computed from the calibration exercise and the values of these parameters
implied by (29) and computed as the ratio of labor productivity growth and the ratio of real investments in a sector and the
sum of real value added in services and goods sectors. The values of γξ1 and γξ2 computed from the calibration exercise
are invariant to the choice of the value of γ.
I conduct several counterfactual exercises. First, I examine the effect of 10 percent
reduction in αk,1 in goods and services sectors on sectoral growth rates, as well as on the
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growth rate of final output. As a policy, this corresponds to increasing the strength of
property rights in these sectors. Panels A.1 and A.2 of Table 3 summarize the results in
terms of percentage changes of the growth rates. Strengthening property rights in a sector
increases innovation and growth in that sector and reduces innovation and growth in the
other sector. The negative effects are rather limited and the growth rate of total output
increases with stronger property rights in both sectors. The elasticity of the growth rate
and innovation in a sector with respect to the strength of property rights is higher in the
goods sector than in services. This result seems intuitive and suggests that the strength
of property rights is more important in the goods sector than in services. However, the
elasticity of the growth rate of final output with respect to the strength of property rights
in the goods sector is virtually the same as the elasticity with respect to the strength of
property rights in the services sector. This is because services have a higher weight in
final output. The highest increase in the growth rate of total output can be obtained
increasing the strength of property rights in both sectors. According to Panel A.3 of
Table 3, 10 percent reduction of α1,1 and α2,1 increases the growth rate of total output
by about 8 percent in sample countries.
I also examine the effect of 10 percent reduction of markups, 1/ek, in goods and
services sectors. Panels B.1 and B.2 of Table 3 summarize the results. Similarly to
stronger property rights, a higher level of competition in a sector increases innovation
and growth in that sector and reduces innovation and growth in the other sector. However,
the effect of a higher level of competition in a sector is weaker than the effect of stronger
property rights. Moreover, the positive and negative effects are quite comparable and the
growth rate of total output is almost not affected by stronger competition in either of
the sectors. It slightly increases with higher competition in the goods sector and declines
with higher competition in the services sector. These result can be important at least
for two reasons. They suggest that the aggregate effects of increasing competition in
goods sector and/or services sector on long-run growth can be rather limited. Clearly, a
higher level of competition can affect economic performance and welfare by improving the
allocative/static efficiency. For example, Forni et al. (2010) and Eggertsson et al. (2014)
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Table 3: The Growth Effects of Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights and Increasing
Product Market Competition
A.1: -10%∆ in α1,1 A.2: -10%∆ in α2,1 A.3: -10%∆ in α1,1 and α2,1
%∆ in g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC
Germany 10.568 -0.706 4.089 -1.891 8.075 3.836 8.491 7.326 7.821
UK 10.715 -0.496 4.177 -1.760 8.393 4.161 8.776 7.865 8.245
US 10.622 -0.683 3.771 -1.763 8.076 4.200 8.684 7.352 7.877
B.1: -10%∆ in 1/e1 B.2: -10%∆ in 1/e2 B.3: -10%∆ in 1/e1 and 1/e2
%∆ in g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC
Germany 0.785 -0.461 0.069 -2.336 1.371 -0.206 -1.561 0.916 -0.137
UK 1.174 -0.447 0.229 -1.399 0.532 -0.273 -0.236 0.090 -0.046
US 1.460 -0.631 0.193 -2.592 1.120 -0.343 -1.155 0.499 -0.153
C: -10%∆ in α1,1, α2,1, D.2: US values for α1,1, D.1: US values for
1/e1, and 1/e2 α2,1, 1/e1, and 1/e2 α1,1 and α2,1
%∆ in g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC
Germany 6.782 8.307 7.659 19.348 -9.114 2.992 25.337 -11.791 4.001
UK 8.518 7.962 8.193 30.870 9.242 18.257 22.045 12.341 16.386
US 7.420 7.889 7.705
Note: This table offers the effects of strengthening intellectual property rights (10% reduction in αk,1) and increasing
product market competition (10% reduction in 1/ek) on labor productivity growth rates in goods and services sectors (g1
and g2) and on the growth rate of the economy [gC = σ1g1 + (1− σ1) g2]. The effects are computed as percentage changes
from the values of growth rates offered in Table 1. Goods sector is sector 1 and services sector is sector 2.
show that, indeed, a higher level of competition in services sector increases welfare in
European countries. These papers do not incorporate sector-level R&D in their models,
and my results suggest that that is not a significant omission at least from the perspective
of long-run growth. Moreover, these results suggest that it is important to control for
competition in the remainder of the economy (or in closely related industries) in studies
of the impact of competition on innovation and long-run growth in an industry/a sector
(e.g., Blundell et al., 1999, Aghion et al., 2005).10
In Panel C of Table 3, I also examine the effect of 10 percent increase in the strength
of property rights and product market competition in both sectors. The results from this
10In the Empirical Appendix, I use the data of Aghion et al. (2005) and offer evidence that innovation in
a sector can be negatively affected by competition in closely related sectors. This evidence outlines an
area of potentially fruitful future research.
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exercise are similar to those for 10 percent increase in the strength of property rights.
This holds because increasing the level of product market competition has rather limited
effect on sectoral growth rates.11
The effect of increasing product market competition in a sector on the growth rate of
the sector is limited because increasing competition entails two and opposing effects on
R&D and growth. Increasing the level of competition in a sector increases the resources
devoted to production in that sector, Lx. As a consequence, it increases the marginal
product of innovation and the resources devoted to R&D, Lr. On the other hand, however,
increasing the level of competition reduces Lr because it reduces the amount of resources
which can be devoted to R&D. These positive and negative effects on Lr are of a second
order since they follow from the changes in Lx. Moreover, the positive effect is only
marginally stronger than the negative effect under the current parametrization of the
model. On the other hand, the effect of strengthening the property rights in a sector
on the growth rate of the sector is larger than the effect of increasing product market
competition because stronger property rights have a first order effect on R&D and growth.
They increase the returns on R&D and Lr.
In the data, the strength of the property rights and the level of competition in product
market can be correlated because, for example, stronger property rights in a sector can
restrict entry into the sector. The comparison of the values of markups and α1,1 in the
US with these values in Germany and the UK can provide evidence for such a pattern.
According to the values of α1,1, property rights in goods sector are stronger in the US than
in Germany and the UK, where these are of the same order of magnitude. Meanwhile,
the level of competition in goods sector is lower in the US than in Germany and the
UK according to the values of 1/e1. However, the exact relation between the level of
competition and the strength of the property rights is a priori ambiguous, and this model
is silent about such a relation given its level of abstraction. One way to incorporate such
a relation assumes US values of markups and αk,1 for Germany and the UK. The growth
11Table 4 in the Empirical Appendix presents the effects of reducing the strength of property rights and
product market competition. In absolute terms, these effects are comparable to the effects of increasing
the strength of property rights and product market competition.
23
rate of final output in Germany and the UK increases when these countries have the
same level of property rights and competition in goods and services sectors as in the US
according to Panels D.1 and D.2 of Table 3. Moreover, these results are almost entirely
driven by the differences in the strength of property rights and are almost not affected
by the level of competition.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, I analyze the effect of intellectual property and product market competition
regulations on innovation and growth in the long-run in an endogenous growth model
which features two R&D performing sectors. I show that stronger intellectual property
rights and more intensive product market competition in a sector increase its innovation
and growth. However, they reduce innovation and growth in the rival sector.
These results imply that the effect of economy wide changes in intellectual property
and product market competition regulations on long-run growth can be ambiguous. Sim-
ilarly, the effect of changes in intellectual property and competition regulations in a sector
on economic growth can be ambiguous.
I attempt to resolve this ambiguity and provide better informed policy implications
from the model. To do so, I perform a simplistic calibration exercise for goods and
services sectors in Germany, the UK, and the US. The results from this exercise suggest
that stronger property rights in goods and services sectors imply higher economic growth
in these countries. Such results hold when property rights are strengthened in one of the
sectors, as well as in both sectors. They hold because stronger property rights in a sector
have a large positive effect on its growth and very marginal negative effect on the growth
rate of the other sector. However, economic growth almost does not change with a higher
level of competition in these sectors because the positive effects of higher competition in
a sector are almost fully offset by the negative effects in the other sector. This result
holds when competition is intensified in one of the sectors and in both sectors.
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5 Technical Appendix
Definition of Equilibrium
The decentralized equilibrium in this model is the paths of the quantities
{
C,A,
{
Xk,
{
xk,j, Lxk,j , Lrk,j , λk,j, λ¯k,j
}Nk
j=1
, {uk,i,j, uk,j,i}Nkj,i=1(j 6=i)
}
k=1,2
}
and prices {
r, w,
{{
pxk,j , pλk,j , pλk,i
}Nk
j,i=1
}
k=1,2
}
such that:
• The household chooses C,
{
Xk,
{
xk,j, Lxk,j , Lrk,j
}Nk
j=1
}
k=1,2
, and the evolution of A
to maximize its utility, given r, w,
{{
pxk,j
}Nk
j=1
}
k=1,2
and the current value of A.
• The firm j = 1, ..., Nk in sector k = 1, 2 maximizes its value, given
{
pλk,j , pλk,i
}Nk
j,i=1(j 6=i)
and the current value of λk,j.
– It chooses
{
Lxk,j , Lrk,j
}Nk
j=1
and {uk,i,j, uk,j,i}Nkj,i=1(j 6=i) subject to the inverse de-
mand for its product under Cournot competition.
– It chooses
{
pxk,j , Lrk,j
}Nk
j=1
and {uk,i,j, uk,j,i}Nkj,i=1(j 6=i) subject to the demand for
its product under Bertrand competition.
• Labor market clears:
L =
2∑
k=1
(NkLxk +NkLrk) .
• Knowledge market in each sector k = 1, 2 clears:
Nk∑
j=1
Nk∑
i=1,i 6=j
uk,i,jλk,j =
Nk∑
j=1
Nk∑
i=1,i 6=j
uk,j,iλk,i.
• Spillovers are firm independent and are given by λ¯k = 1Nk
Nk∑
j=1
λk,j.
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Proof of Proposition 1
I use (5) and (9) to obtain a relation between labor force allocations in sectors 1 and 2
in a symmetric equilibrium in these sectors:
N2Lx2 = DN1Lx1 , (30)
where D is given by (19). This relation, together with the labor market clearing condition,
L =
2∑
k=1
(NkLxk +NkLrk) , (31)
implies that labor force allocations to production in sectors 1 and 2 are given by
N1Lx1 = (1 +D)
−1
(
L−
2∑
k=1
NkLrk
)
, (32)
N2Lx2 = D (1 +D)
−1
(
L−
2∑
k=1
NkLrk
)
. (33)
All variables grow at constant rates on a balanced growth path. From (7), (32), and
(33), it follows that labor allocations are constant on that path.
I use equations (7), (9), (10), (14), (13), (16), and (17) to rewrite (15) in the following
way:
q˙λk
qλk
= r − λ˙k
λk
(
γk
NkLxk
NkLrk
+ 1− αk,1
)
.
From the Euler equation (2) and (9), (10), (5), it follows that another equation for the
returns on knowledge accumulation is
q˙λk
qλk
= r − ρ− λ˙k
λk
.
I combine these two equations to obtain
0 = ρ− λ˙k
λk
(
γk
NkLxk
NkLrk
− αk,1
)
. (34)
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This expression, together with (7), (32) and (33), determines labor force allocations
in balanced growth path equilibrium. The labor force allocations are given by
N1Lx1 =
ξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
α2,1
γ2
L+
(
ξ2
α2,1
γ2
1
γ1
+ ξ1
α1,1
γ1
1
γ2
)
ρ
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
} , (35)
N2Lx2 =DN1Lx1 , (36)
and
N1Lr1 =
ξ1ξ2
α2,1
γ2
L− ξ2
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
ρ
γ1
+ ξ1
ρ
γ2
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
} , (37)
N2Lr2 =
Dξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
L− ξ1
[
α1,1
γ1
(1 +D) + 1
]
ρ
γ2
+ ξ2D
ρ
γ1
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
} . (38)
I assume that parameter values are such that N1Lr1 and N2Lr2 are positive so that both
sectors innovate in balanced growth path equilibrium.
In order to obtain equation (28), I use (34) and the fact that labor productivity growth
in sector k is given by
gk = γkgλk ,
where g denotes growth rate.
Proof of Corollary 1
The growth rate of λk can be derived from (7):
gλk = ξkNkLrk ,
where N1Lr1 and N2Lr2 are given by (37) and (38).
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Using (35)-(38), it can be shown that
∂
∂D
N1Lx1 =−
ξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
α2,1
γ2
L+ ξ1
α1,1
γ1
ρ
γ2
+ ξ2
α2,1
γ2
ρ
γ1
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2 α1,1γ1
(
α2,1
γ2
+ 1
)
< 0, (39)
∂
∂D
N1Lr1 =−
ξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
α2,1
γ2
L+ ξ1
α1,1
γ1
ρ
γ2
+ ξ2
ρ
γ1
α2,1
γ2
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2 (α2,1γ2 + 1
)
< 0, (40)
and
∂
∂D
N2Lx2 =
ξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
α2,1
γ2
L+ ξ1
α1,1
γ1
ρ
γ2
+ ξ2
α2,1
γ2
ρ
γ1
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2 α2,1γ2
(
α1,1
γ1
+ 1
)
> 0, (41)
∂
∂D
N2Lr2 =
ξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
α2,1
γ2
L+ ξ1
α1,1
γ1
ρ
γ2
+ ξ2
ρ
γ1
α2,1
γ2
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2 (α1,1γ1 + 1
)
> 0. (42)
According to (19), D declines with e1 and increases with e2. Therefore, output, R&D and
growth in sector k increase with the level of competition in sector k and decline with the
level of competition in the other sector. A uniform increase of competition in both sectors
can either increase or reduce D depending on the values of e1 and e2. Let e = (e1, e2),
∂
∂e
D =
1− σ
σ
1
e2 (e1 − 1)
e1 (e1 − 1)− e2 (e2 − 1)
e2 (e1 − 1) .
When e1 = e2, D does not depend on the levels of competition in sectors 1 and 2.
This implies that the level of competition does not matter for resource allocations in the
economy and imperfect/oligopolistic competition does not distort them. Such a result
holds because all price levels are equally affected by imperfect competition when e1 = e2
and the relative prices are not.
The partial derivative of the growth rate of consumption goods (final output) with
respect to D can be derived from (3), (4), (6), (40), and (42). It is given by
∂
∂D
gC =−
ξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
α2,1
γ2
L+ ξ1
α1,1
γ1
ρ
γ2
+ ξ2
ρ
γ1
α2,1
γ2
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2
×
[
σ1γ1ξ1
(
α2,1
γ2
+ 1
)
− (1− σ1) γ2ξ2
(
α1,1
γ1
+ 1
)]
.
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The sign of this expression depends on the values of model parameters. This means that
the effect of changing the level of competition in sector k and/or uniformly changing the
level of competition in both sectors on long-run growth depends on model parameters.
For example, ∂gC/∂D is negative (positive) when σ1 > 1/2 (σ1 < 1/2) and the effect of
changing the level of competition on growth in sector 2 is higher (lower) than this effect
in sector 1. It is necessarily negative (positive) if σ1 = 1/2, γ1 = γ2, α2,1 = α1,1, and
ξ1 > ξ2 (ξ1 < ξ2).
12
The partial derivatives of labor force allocations with respect to αk,1 can be readily
derived from (35)-(38). The partial derivatives with respect to α1,1 are given by
∂
∂α1,1
N1Lx1 =
α2,1
γ2
1
γ1
ξ1ξ2L
α2,1
γ2
−
{
ξ2
1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
− ξ1 1γ2
}
ρ
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2 > 0, (43)
∂
∂α1,1
N1Lr1 =−
ξ1ξ2
α2,1
γ2
L− ξ2
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
ρ
γ1
+ ξ1
ρ
γ2
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2 1γ1 (44)
×
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
< 0, (45)
and
∂
∂α1,1
N2Lx2 =D
α2,1
γ2
1
γ1
ξ1ξ2L
α2,1
γ2
−
{
ξ2
1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
− ξ1 1γ2
}
ρ
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2 > 0, (46)
∂
∂α1,1
N2Lr2 =
1
γ1
D
ξ1ξ2
α2,1
γ2
L− ξ2
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
ρ
γ1
+ ξ1
ρ
γ2
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2 > 0. (47)
In turn, the partial derivatives with respect to α2,1 are given by
∂
∂α2,1
N1Lx1 =
1
γ2
α1,1
γ1
Dξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
L− ξ1
[
α1,1
γ1
(1 +D) + 1
]
ρ
γ2
+ ξ2D
ρ
γ1
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2 > 0, (48)
12This derivative is also negative (positive) if σ1 = 1/2, γ1 = γ2, ξ1 = ξ2, and α2,1 > α1,1 (α2,1 < α1,1).
Therefore, the strength of property rights can play an important role for the effect of product market
competition in an industry on economic growth.
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∂∂α2,1
N1Lr1 =
1
γ2
Dξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
L− ξ1
[
α1,1
γ1
(1 +D) + 1
]
ρ
γ2
+ ξ2D
ρ
γ1
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2 > 0. (49)
and
∂
∂α2,1
N2Lx2 =D
1
γ2
α1,1
γ1
Dξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
L− ξ1
[
α1,1
γ1
(1 +D) + 1
]
ρ
γ2
+ ξ2D
ρ
γ1
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2 > 0, (50)
∂
∂α2,1
N2Lr2 =−
Dξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
L− ξ1
[
α1,1
γ1
(1 +D) + 1
]
ρ
γ2
+ ξ2D
ρ
γ1
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2 (51)
× 1
γ2
[
α1,1
γ1
(1 +D) + 1
]
< 0. (52)
These results imply that reducing αk,1 increases R&D and growth in sector k and reduces
R&D and growth in the other sector.
The effect of a uniform change of α1,1 and α2,1 on the growth rate in sector k is given
by the sum of the partial derivatives of NkLrk with respect to α1,1 and α2,1. The sign
and the magnitude of this effect depend on model parameters.
The partial derivatives of the growth rate of consumption goods (final output) with
respect to α1,1 and α2,1 can be derived from (3), (4), (6), and (43)-(52). They are given
by
∂
∂α1,1
gC =− 1
γ1
ξ1ξ2
α2,1
γ2
L− ξ2
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
ρ
γ1
+ ξ1
ρ
γ2
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2
×
{
σ1γ1ξ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
− (1− σ1) γ2ξ2D
}
,
and
∂
∂α2,1
gC =
1
γ2
Dξ1ξ2
α1,1
γ1
L− ξ1
[
α1,1
γ1
(1 +D) + 1
]
ρ
γ2
+ ξ2D
ρ
γ1
ξ1ξ2
{
α1,1
γ1
[
α2,1
γ2
(1 +D) +D
]
+ α2,1
γ2
}2
×
{
σ1γ1ξ1 −
[
α1,1
γ1
(1 +D) + 1
]
(1− σ1) γ2ξ2
}
.
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The signs of these expressions depend on the values of model parameters. This means
that the effects of changing α1,1 and α2,1 on long-run growth depend on model parameters.
For example, ∂gC/∂α1,1 is negative (positive) when σ1 > 1/2 (σ1 < 1/2) and the effect of
changing α1,1 on growth in sector 1 is higher (lower) than this effect on growth in sector
2. Both these expressions are negative when σ1 = 1/2, ξ1 = ξ2, and γ1 = γ2.
The effect of a uniform change of α1,1 and α2,1 on gC is given by the sum of the partial
derivatives of gC with respect to α1,1 and α2,1. The sign and the magnitude of this effect
depend on model parameters.
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6 Empirical Appendix
6.1 Further Results
Table 4: The Growth Effects of Weakening Intellectual Property Rights and Reducing Product
Market Competition
A.1: 10%∆ in α1,1 A.2: 10%∆ in α2,1 A.3: 10%∆ in α1,1 and α2,1
%∆ in g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC
Germany -8.724 0.583 -3.375 1.628 -6.952 -3.303 -7.229 -6.401 -6.753
UK -8.824 0.408 -3.440 1.507 -7.187 -3.563 -7.444 -6.802 -7.070
US -8.761 0.563 -3.110 1.518 -6.953 -3.616 -7.368 -6.421 -6.794
B.1: 10%∆ in 1/e1 B.2: 10%∆ in 1/e2 B.3: 10%∆ in 1/e1 and 1/e2
%∆ in g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC g1 g2 gC
Germany -1.223 0.024 -0.506 2.437 -1.431 0.214 1.638 -0.962 0.144
UK -1.494 0.130 -0.547 1.435 -0.546 0.280 0.244 -0.093 0.047
US -1.856 0.241 -0.585 2.711 -1.171 0.358 1.217 -0.526 0.161
C: 10%∆ in α1,1, α2,1,
1/e1, and 1/e2
%∆ in g1 g2 gC
Germany -5.721 -7.303 -6.630
UK -7.220 -6.888 -7.027
US -6.247 -6.912 -6.650
Note: This table offers the effects of weakening intellectual property rights (10% increase in αk,1) and reducing product
market competition (10% increase in 1/ek) on labor productivity growth rates in goods and services sectors (g1 and g2)
and on the growth rate of the economy [gC = σ1g1 + (1− σ1) g2]. The effects are computed as percentage changes from
the values of growth rates offered in Table 1. Goods sector is sector 1 and services sector is sector 2.
6.2 An Extension of Aghion et al. (2005)
In this section, I use the data and an extension of the empirical methodology of Aghion
et al. (2005) and present evidence that innovation in an industry can be affected by
competition in closely related industries.
Aghion et al. (2005) aim to identify the effect of competition in industries on innova-
tion and growth. They use data from the UK for 17 SIC 2-digit manufacturing industries
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and the period of 1973–1994. They use the number of citation-weighted patents in each
industry as an indicator of innovation/R&D. In turn, they compute the intensity of com-
petition in an industry in the following way:
cjt = 1− 1
Njt
∑
i∈j
liit,
where Njt is the number of firms in industry j at time t, i indexes firms, and li is the
price cost margin/Learner index. Aghion et al. (2005) compute it as
liit =
operating profits - financial costs
sales
.
They run a regression of the following form
E [pjt|cjt, xjt] = exp
(
β1cjt + β2c
2
jt + x
′
jtΓ
)
, (53)
where pjt is the citation-weighted number of patents, β1, β2 and Γ are parameters and
x′jt are control variables. To alleviate reverse causality concerns, Aghion et al. (2005) use
control function approach. They find that β1 > 0 and β2 < 0 and that the relationship
between competition and innovation has an inverted-U shape. In column 1 of Table 5, I
present their preferred results from column 4 of Table 1 of their paper (see also a recent
correction of that table).
In the main text, I show that competition for factor inputs across two industries can
create a link between competition in an industry and innovation in the other industry.
I utilize 2-digit SIC symmetric input-output table and develop a measure of proximity
among industries in terms of factor inputs to formally test this in a setting with multiple
industries. From the input-output table, I obtain the shares of compensations of each
input out of total input compensation in 2-digit SIC industries in the UK in 1984.13 For
each industry, I compute the Euclidian distances among the vector of its input compen-
13I use input-output tables from 1984 because industry classification in this table directly matches with
industry classification used by Aghion et al. (2005). Using a fixed year for shares may not be a major
issue because usually the shares of compensations change very little over time.
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sation shares and the vectors of input compensation shares of the remainder of industries.
The distances of these vectors are a measure of dissimilarity among industries, and I take
their inverse to obtain a measure of proximity between industries. Let θjm be the values
of this proximity measure between industries j and m. I replace θjj = 0 and compute for
industry j the interaction between its proximity to other industries and competition in
those industries,
cˆjt =
∑
m
θjmcmt.
The data of Aghion et al. (2005) is unbalanced and many (non-overlapping) years are
missing for SIC industries 23, 35, 37 and 49. I drop these industries from the sample
because keeping them severely restricts the number of observations when computing cˆjt.
Column 2 of Table 5 offers the results from the estimation of specification (53) for the
restricted sample.
I augment (53) with additional terms and estimate the following regression
E [pjt|cjt, xjt] = exp
(
β1cjt + β2c
2
jt + δ1cˆjt + δ2cˆ
2
jt + x
′
jtΓ
)
. (54)
According to the theoretical model developed in the main text, the estimate of β1 is
expected to be positive and the estimate of δ1 to be negative. It can also be expected
that the estimate of β2 is negative so that the relationship between competition and
innovation in an industry has a shape resembling an inverted-U. This is because, in this
model, the relationship between competition and innovation in an industry is increasing
and concave, as long as there is a positive amount of innovation. Moreover, increasing
competition in an industry reduces profits in (8) and there is a level of competition when
profits are equal to zero. Innovation increases with competition till this level and ceases
when the level of competition increases from this level. In the same vein, the estimate of
δ2 can be expected to be positive since resources which can be devoted to R&D decline
with competition in rival industries at a declining rate. This is because of the concave
relationship between competition and innovation in an industry. Moreover, they increase
in an industry if some of the rival industries stop innovating.
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Column 3 of Table 5 reports the results from the estimation of specification (54)
under the restriction β1 = β2 = 0. Column 4 of Table 5 reports the results without this
restriction. As expected, the estimate of δ1 is negative. which suggests that innovation in
an industry can decline with higher competition in other and closely related industries.
The estimates of β1, β2, and δ2 also have the expected signs.
According to Column 4 of Table 5, it is important to control for cˆ and cˆ2 in (54) for
the identification of the magnitude of estimates of β1 and β2. These estimates change by
about 10 percent when cˆ and cˆ2 are controlled for.14
Table 5: The Effects of Competition on Innovation
Dependent variable: citation-weighted
count of patents in industry j at time t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cjt 386.592*** 246.337*** 220.652**
(67.611) (93.873) (95.365)
c2jt -205.320*** -127.915*** -114.630**
(36.105) (50.346) (51.124)
cˆjt -104.314*** -72.159*
(40.486) (41.811)
cˆ2jt 38.222*** 26.223*
(15.185) (15.736)
Observations 354 286 286 286
Note: This table presents the results from the estimation of specification (54). Column 1 reports the results from column 4
of Table 1 of Aghion et al. (2005). These results can be obtained estimating (54) for the full sample of industries and under
parameter restriction δ1 = δ2 = 0. Column 2 reports the results when I drop from the sample SIC industries 23, 35, 37
and 49 and keep δ1 = δ2 = 0. In columns 3 and 4, SIC industries 23, 35, 37 and 49 are dropped from the sample. Columns
3 and 4 report the results from the estimation of specification (54) with and without parameter restriction β1 = β2 = 0,
correspondingly. All regressions include industry and year dummies and use the Poisson regression framework. Moreover,
all regressions are carried using the control function method. To implement it, cjt and cˆjt are linearly projected on a set of
exogenous instruments (see, for the list of insruments, Aghion et al., 2005). The residuals from these projections are added
in (54) as independent variables. The exogenous instruments are jointly significant in these projections and R-squares are
higher than 0.8. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level.
The results reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 constitute a first attempt to show
that competition in an industry can affect innovation and growth in other industries.
They outline an area of potentially fruitful future research.
14It has to be noted that these changes are not statistically significant, even though they are economically
sizeable.
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